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The EU “Northern Dimension” initiative was put forward by Finland in 
1997 and was first adopted by the European Commission as a strategy of the 
EU for 2000—2003 in 1999. The key element of the “Northern Dimension” 
is the development of cross-border cooperation between separate administra-
tive units of member states. In accordance with the EU documents, it in-
cludes the territories of Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Baltic States and 
Poland, as well as Karelia, the Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Leningrad, Pskov, 
Novgorod, Vologda, Kaliningrad regions of the Russian Federation and 
Saint-Petersburg. 
The unique character of the “Northern Dimension” programme (ND) lies 
in cooperation between participants conducted both vertically and horizon-
tally at several levels: the state, regional and local ones. For Russia, the ND 
means an additional possibility to attract the attention of partners to the use 
of resources located in underdeveloped areas, as well as to find joint solu-
tions to the problems of the Russian North-West cross border areas [2, 
p. 180]. For instance: environment protection, transport and border infra-
structure, unemployment and healthcare problems and other issues. 
The development of the ND is, to a great extent, an activity in the 
framework of certain policies. But it has a distinct horizontal dimension, 
where coordination plays a significant role. Interaction and coordination of 
the EU instruments and international finance institutions can provide for 
higher efficiency and lead to practical results, especially in funding 
In 2003, the European Commission adopted the Second Northern Di-
mension Action Plan for 2004—2006. The second ND was aimed at contrib-
uting to the implementation of the Neighbourhood policy. Now, two partner-
ships are taking place in the ND framework: the Environmental Partnership 
and Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being (established in ac-
cordance with the Declaration adopted at the Oslo International Conference 
on October 27—28, 2003). In four years, the Environmental Partnership has 
proved itself an efficient multilateral cooperation mechanism with an ade-
quate financial base and project manager — The European Bank for Recon-
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struction and Development. The total amount of funding is 1.8 billion euros. 
Fifteen projects are being implemented in the Partnership framework that are 
mainly financed by international development banks on a repayable basis, 
while a part of finance is provided by the Special Environmental Partnership 
Foundation as grants. 
The first priority projects in the framework of the partnership are South-
Eastern sewage disposal plants in Saint Petersburg (completed in 2005), the 
flood protection system in Saint Petersburg, the sludge combustion plant in 
Saint Petersburg (completed in 2007), the environmental investment pro-
gramme for the Leningrad region; modernisation of housing and public utili-
ties in Arkhangelsk, Syktyvkar and Novgorod, the modernisation of central 
heating systems in Kaliningrad and Murmansk, the organisation of waste 
management in Kaliningrad, cessation of waste disposal into the Neva, the 
Ladoga ecological programme, water supply in Kaliningrad and Vologda [3, 
p. 31]. 
Though the ND initiative was highly criticized from the beginning, it led 
to certain tangible results. Perhaps, its main advantage is the contribution to 
the efficient involvement of Russia into European structures beyond the so-
called “high politics”. The interest in the ND, its implementation and theo-
retical experience are expanding beyond Northern Europe and immediate 
participant states [6]. 
However, the ND initiative is not merely interesting in itself, but also in 
the context of EU-Russia relations. From a theoretical perspective, the ND 
can be considered an element of strategically connected multilevel interac-
tions between the EU member states and Russia. Researchers have repeat-
edly emphasised the principal importance of the multilevel character of rela-
tions between these actors. It concerns (1) relations between the EU and 
Russian institutions; (2) bilateral Russia-the EU member states relations; (3) 
cross-border relations and cooperation at regional (subnational) level [12]. 
Proceeding from this, we can take the next step and try to analyse the conse-
quences and effects of strategic interdependence between all Russia-the EU 
relation levels in more details. 
Our basic argument is that both actors interacting at numerous institu-
tional levels and balancing between them are trying to achieve different 
goals at the same time. The key actors should take into account the conse-
quences of interaction at different levels, but at the same time they differ-
ently estimate the results of these interactions. Thus the choice or rejection 
of cooperation strategy (or tactics) at one level can explain the character of 
decisions made at other levels. 
 
The EU-Russia Relations: General Context 
 
Recently, the EU-Russia relations have developed in a peculiar manner: 
there is a growing discrepancy between the actively developing trade and 
foreign policy relations, which are approaching the ‘freezing point’. In 2007, 
this discrepancy formed a steady tendency, since trade was developing to the 
benefit of both parties, while the sphere of external relations was increas-
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ingly taking forms unfavourable for Russia, significantly weakening the 
international position of Russia not only at the present moment, but also for 
the future. The middle of 2007 conceivably saw the transition to a princi-
pally new paradigm of the EU standpoints in its relation to Russia — Euro-
pean leaders admitted the inadequacy of the attempts to influence the re-
forms in Russia and started establishing mechanisms aimed at the elabora-
tion of joint solutions allowing neutralisation of possible negative actions of 
Russia towards the EU. 
The favourable vector of international relations development reached its 
maximum in 1997 when, finally, the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, signed in 1994, came into effect. At that moment, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam defined the constitutional (contractual) principles of the EU 
foreign policy. 
Relations with Russia were considered a general foreign policy project 
that is characterised by the concordance of the member state objectives, At 
the same time it would be a “pilot project” to test new mechanisms of the 
interaction of the EU (as a body) with the outer world. It was crucial to find 
such a project, because the difficulty of the EU common policy development 
consists in contradictory foreign policy interests of different states, first of 
all, Germany, France and the UK. But, since all the EU member states are 
interested in the predictability of Russia, the provision of this predictability 
is the most evident first priority project of the new common foreign policy 
[1]. The Treaty of Amsterdam defined the EU “common strategies” in for-
eign policy as one of the most important instruments of the EU foreign pol-
icy. The first “common strategy” (adopted in June 1999) was the programme 
aimed at the development of democracy and market competition in Russia. 
In general, it was expected by means of joint efforts it would be possible to 
influence Russia in the same way Western victorious powers influenced the 
development of post-war Germany and Japan, aspiring to the establishment 
of democracy and competitive market as basic tools of a predictable good-
neighbour policy. It is well-know that states with democratically elected 
governments cannot allow themselves to be at enmity with each other. 
In summer 1999, it could seem that Russia got an opportunity to benefit 
from the interest of the EU states in the success of their first foreign policy 
project aimed at the transformation of Russia into a democratic European 
power, consistent with the common European rules. But soon after Vladimir 
Putin had come to power, Russia started resisting the EU attempts to conduct 
common foreign policy towards Russia. First of all, Russia tried to take ad-
vantage of the contradictions within the EU. But soon the attempts to take 
advantage of the contradictions and, especially, to oppose ‘old’ Europe to the 
new members of the EU proved to be counterproductive. It became evident 
in 2007, when, unexpectedly for the Russian diplomacy, Poland blocked the 
subscription of the new PCA planned at the EU-Russia summit in Samara, 
which Russia had been aiming at for five years. The leaders of the Union did 
not merely refrained from calling Poland to ‘order’, but at the summit itself 
(which was not successful due to the Polish veto) Manuel Barroso, the Presi-
dent of the European Commission, firmly declared his support to Poland. 
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It is important to mention, that one of the peculiarities of the EU is the 
fact that this intergovernmental structure is still undergoing the process of 
formation. It defines, to a great extent, the foreign policy strategies of the 
Union, which are motivated more by attempts to create conditions for the 
further accretion of the power to make the EU a real actor of foreign policy 
than by the EU foreign policy interests. Thus member states should reject the 
most significant part of their sovereignty which needs serious stimuli. Now, 
economic cooperation in the framework of the EU has almost reached the 
level of a federative union; and the Union represents the interests of all the 
member states. In other spheres, first of all, in foreign policy, solidarity is 
limited: the principles of decision-making have an intergovernmental charac-
ter, i.e. a decision is made only if the member states reached an accord. It 
means that the mechanism of formulating “common interests” in this sphere 
has not been elaborated yet; there is only a “common denominator” of dif-
ferent interests. 
The prerequisite — the EU has not formed a mechanism of formulating 
common interests — sometimes brings Russian diplomats to the false con-
clusion that it is possible (and one should try) to take advantage of the con-
tradictions between the EU member states. At the same time they do not take 
into account that for many European politicians the basic interest consists in 
establishing common institutes (rules) of the EU foreign policy. Despite 
different positions on certain issues, there is a collective comprehension of 
the necessity to elaborate rules defining the future development of the EU 
foreign policy. 
However, the increasing political tension between the EU and Russia can 
be ‘compensated’ by cooperation at other institutional levels. So, political 
frictions at the highest level can stimulate the participation of the Russian 
government in regional EU initiatives (such as the ND). At the same time, it 
is crucial that, in order to succeed in this balancing between levels, the ND 
context should be separated from the problem field of the ‘high politics’. In 
this case, cross-border and interregional programme(s) will be more efficient 
if they are concentrated around local and not political issues. One should 
admit that such programmes are hardly applicable to such ‘highly’ politi-
cised issues as the development of democracy in Russia, the freedom of me-
dia, human rights, security and energy resource supply. In other words, ex-
perts working at both practical and ideological levels of the ND should con-
sciously avoid being involved in certain (political) problems. 
It is possible to assume that if some actors choose the level of EU-Russia 
relations in general as a priority; others will be interested in the development 
of bilateral relations. So, the priorities of different actors will differ. In gen-
eral, it can be expected that the EU member states and subnational territories 
(regions) will follow different and, maybe, contradictory strategies towards 
Russia. Moreover, the same actor will conduct different strategies at differ-
ent institutional levels. For instance, Finland will act differently in the Euro-
pean Council, in the ND, and in bilateral relations with Russia. This lack of 
consistency in EU foreign policy is a natural consequence of its multilevel 
governmental structure. 
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The development of the ND is a good example of how the tension in the 
‘high politics’ do not restrict cooperation at lower levels. Different forms of 
interregional cooperation in the framework of the ND achieved more signifi-
cant progress that it was expected by the critics of the initiative. Despite 
numerous difficulties, the initiative was not seriously affected and involved in 
the deteriorating relations between Russia and the EU and, what is most impor-
tant, Russia did not withdraw from the initiative maintaining its liabilities. 
 
The Formula of Success: Small Steps of Small Powers 
 
As Aalto shows [4], the ND was, first of all, an attempt to overcome the 
increasing demarcation between the EU and Russia by means of finding joint 
solutions to functional problems and not meeting at another ‘high politics’ 
battle field. Security and political issues were either excluded from the 
agenda or discussed in brief. Maybe, the best decision was not to tackle the 
issue of oil and gas supply in mass media. Only nuclear safety and energy 
efficiency were included in the ND Environmental Partnership. The impor-
tance of the North for the EU energy strategy is understood by ‘European 
bureaucrats’ perfectly well: “The Northern Dimension represents one essen-
tial frontier for security of supply due to the importance of Russian and 
Norwegian energy supplies.” (The EU Commission 1999:11). 
From the very beginning, the ND was oriented towards partnership and 
equality approach, was open to equal partnership of non-EU member states. 
As Lannon and Elsuwege point out: “The fact that these partner countries 
have become involved in the process from the very beginning and partici-
pated in the Foreign Ministers’ conferences on the Northern Dimension is 
rather unusual in the EU context. In other words, the partner countries were 
expected to be not only policy-takers but also policy-makers” [9, p. 25]. 
Browning and Joenniemi [5] agree that openness to external participants is 
indeed a peculiar feature of the ND. For all member-states this involvement 
into the initiative grants an opportunity and grounds for the discussion of 
urgent problems on the basis of equality. The equality and partnership ap-
proach almost guaranteed that the ND would deal with a certain number of 
issues, ‘acceptable’ for all participants. And indeed, the ND, as a rule, con-
ducts functional cooperation in the field of ‘low’ politics. 
Later, Finland started to make efforts to transform the image of the ND 
— from a foreign policy to a cooperation project that equally belonged to the 
participant states and the EU [14, p. 6]. From all the partner states only 
Finland is a member of the EMU, but is still sceptical about a common de-
fence policy. For an outside observer, the ND may seem a project, in the 
framework of which Northern European States try to separately build their 
relations with the rest of the world and Russia in particular. The ND can be 
also considered as a ‘Northern alternative’ to the eastern and southern vec-
tors of the EU development. As Trenin assumes [13] there is a possibility of 
forming a new common global identity — the ‘Northern’ one. 
It was repeatedly emphasized that the ND proves the ability of small EU 
powers to achieve much conducting ‘smart small policies’. If in the case of 
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Russia, it concerns the regions that actively participated in the ND activity 
and success depended to a great extend on the interest and involvement of 
local and regional (subnational) actors. 
It is not a coincidence that such initiatives and projects are implemented 
at subnational level — it demands, in addition, the technology of practically-
oriented cooperation. The attempts to harmonise and realise such projects 
among national governments inevitably lead to significant transaction costs. 
On the contrary, interregional contacts allow keeping costs low; cooperation 
is developing as a ‘general practice’ beyond the ‘high’ policy context. 
 
EU Foreign Policy Subsidiarity Principle 
and Northern Dimension 
 
The development of “dimensions” is a form of exclusion: partnership in 
a certain dimension means that the state cannot count on full membership in 
the Union [8, p. 7]. The ND has both northern and eastern elements. And 
from the point of view of its eastern “geography” it is indeed a border be-
tween Europe and non-Europe [11]. If one understands the ND in this way, 
then it is based in Brussels in the offices where the EU foreign policy is be-
ing elaborated [11, p. 97]. In other words, if one conceptualises the ND as an 
element of the EU foreign policy, then it becomes a restricted regional part 
of the common EU strategy towards Russia. 
Alternative future for the ND could consist in maintaining a certain de-
gree of independence from the EU foreign policy; the ND already has impor-
tant innovations and is different from the traditional instruments of foreign 
policy, which makes it easier to achieve autonomy. The ND is a combination 
of the partnership, equality and multilevel approaches, and such a unique 
combination creates a “special subsidiarity form” — the EU states formulate 
and realise foreign policy in collaboration with external actors able to gener-
ate necessary ‘power’ to solve certain problems [7, p. 390]. Such subsidiary 
allows the EU to conduct its multilevel foreign policy. On the other hand, the 
most concerned member states can avoid the contradictions of ‘high’ politics 
focusing on those fields of cooperation where the participation of regional 
and subregional actors will lead to the creation of additional value (the 
Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document, 2006). 
The subsidiarity principle applied to the ND drastically differs from the 
ideas of “two-speed Europe” and “Europe of regions”. Perhaps, it can be 
easily explained by means of multilevel governance approach, which implies 
that the actors can influence the decision-making process in the EU by nu-
merous means — from collaborating with European institutions to indirect 
actions through regional, national and subnational bodies. The policy thus 
formed is a result of overlapping jurisdictions, tensions and conflicts in the 
multilevel governance system [10]. 
Applying this subsidiarity logic to the ND one can expect the process of 
‘localised’ decision making become decentralised, i. e. dispersed among 
different institutional levels — regional, national, subnational; while supra-
national institutions will maintain responsibility for formulating the common 
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policy towards Russia. Thus, different questions will be located in the juris-
diction of different actor in dependence on their importance and presence of 
common interest. 
Let us mention, that the ND subsidiarity logic does not contradict (but 
supplements) our argument put forward in the beginning of the article: the 
key actors will define their strategies in accordance with, firstly, the general 
context of EU-Russia relations, and, secondly, prioritisation at different lev-
els and concerning different issues. European (supranational) actors are more 
likely to benefit from the participation of the ND in ‘high’ politics then the 
participant states, subnational units and the Region in general. 
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